British Packet

AND

ARGENTINE NEWS.

(No. 1033. BUENOS AYRES, SATURDAY, JUNE 6th, 1846. *Established in* 1826.)

BUENOS AYRES.

Many of our readers will recollect the deafening outcry raised by the humanity-mongers in Montevideo, on occasion of the issuing of a certain circular by President Oribe, in 1843, at the period of the embodiment of the French and Italian mercenaries. This circular, it will be remembered, furnished Commodore Purvis with a pretext for the first overt act of hostility he perpetrated against the Republics of La Plata; "the cruelty of the threat which it contained, and the language in which it was couched being such as, in his opinion, would disgrace even the petty States of Barbary." We recall this fact, in the first place, because it is understood that Lord Aberdeen's principal voucher to prove the alleged atrocious character of the warfare carried on in the River Plate, is this same circular of President Oribe; and, secondly, because it affords us an opportunity of placing this much-maligned document in juxtaposition with the *mild* and *humane* proclamation lately published by Sir Henry Hardinge on the breaking out of the war in the Punjaub. Let the candid reader, leaving every consideration of relative justice aside, and even waiving the circumstance that it is from an "infant" Prince with whose country "the British Government has ever been on terms of friendship," that such vast territories are wrested,—pronounce his decision as to the "cruelty of the threat" in both cases respectively.

Circular of President Oribe.

Head-quarters, April 1, 1843.

The undersigned has learned with infinite displeasure, that various foreigners, of those resident in Montevideo, make use of their influence in order to obtain partizans for the ruthless rebel Unitarians, and that others take up arms in the same cause.

The undersigned, it is well known, has ever respected the persons and property of the subjects of other nations, because civilization, justice, and his own feelings have so prompted him, whilst they confined themselves to the sphere appertaining to them; but these considerations counsel him to take an entirely different course, and to act with rigour against those who lose sight of their position, by taking part in matters with which they have no concern, whether led thereto by interest or any other motive.

The undersigned, therefore, finds himself under the necessity of declaring to * * * * that he will not respect the quality of foreigner neither in person or property in the subjects of other nations who take part with the infamous ruthless Unitarian rebels, in opposition to the cause of the laws which the undersigned and the forces under his command sustain, but that they will be considered in that case as rebels, and ruthless Unitarians, and treated as such without any consideration.

The undersigned salutes &c., &c., &c.,

MANUEL ORIBE.

By order of H. E.

CARLOS G. VILLADEMOROS.

Proclamation by the Right Hon. the Governor-General of India.

* * * * * * * *

The Sikh army has now, without a shadow of provocation, invaded the British territories.

The Governor-General must, therefore, take measures for effectually protecting the British provinces, for vindicating the authority of the British Government, and for punishing the violators of treaties, and the disturbers of public peace.

The Governor-General hereby declares the possessions of Maharajah Dhuleep Singh on the left or British bank of the Sutlej confiscated and annexed to the British territories.

The Governor-General will respect the existing rights of all Jagheedars, Zamindars, and tenants in the said possessions, who, by the course they now pursue, evince their fidelity to the British Government.

The Governor-General hereby calls upon all the chiefs and Sirdars in the protected territories to co-operate cordially with the British Government for the punishment of the common enemy, and for the maintenance of order in these states. Those of the chiefs who show alacrity and fidelity in the discharge of this duty which they owe to the protecting power, will find their interests promoted thereby, and those who take a contrary course will be treated as enemies to the British Government, and will be punished accordingly.

The inhabitants of all the territories on the left bank of the Sutlej are hereby directed to abide peaceably in their respective villages, where they will receive efficient protection by the British Government. All parties of men found in armed bands, who can give no satisfactory account of their proceedings, will be treated as disturbers of the public peace.

All subjects of the British Government and those who possess estates on both sides the river Sutlej, who by their faithful adherence to the British Government may be liable to sustain loss, shall be indemnified and secured in their just rights and privileges.

On the other hand, all subjects of the British Government who shall continue in the service of the Lahore state, and who disobey this proclamation by not immediately returning to their allegiance, will be liable to have their property on this side the Sutlej confiscated, and declared to be aliens and enemies of the British Government.

By order of the Right Hon. the Governor-General of India.

F. CURRIE,
Secretary to the Government of India with the Governor-General.

Camp, Lushkuree Khan-ke-Serai,
Dec. 13, 1845.

It is clear from this, that, whatever the Peel Ministry may have done in regard to the Corn-Laws, they still cling tenaciously to the sliding scale in their foreign policy. Else, how is it that, in their view,—for Commodore Purvis was borne out by them,—it is "cruel" and "barbarous" in the River Plate to treat as enemies those who take part with enemies, and it is allowable, nay, commendable, to refine upon such "cruelty" and "barbarity" in India! Lord Aberdeen, with all his casuistry, cannot gild over this revolting monstrosity.

A propos of the proceedings in India. The following short paragraph from the London "Weekly News" of the 1st March furnishes ample matter for reflection:—

THE INDIAN SLAUGHTER.

The British sword has again made courses in which foreign blood has freely flowed. The blood of Englishmen has mingled in the current. As water undermines fabrics, so bloodshed saps the formation of empires. We have no "laughter of triumph" for this "victory" to mingle in cadences of mockery with the sighs of those who mourn over the lost ones. India seems to be for England a kind of "cockpit," in which fighting is to be studied. In the awards of just retribution, the pupils whom we seek to sacrifice may immolate us in return. In one of his most splendid passages, Gibbon says of the Roman Empire—"that her domestic decay arose from the unjust extension of her colonial possessions." He says, "that the branches became so numerous, and so strong, that the parent trunk sunk beneath their weight." Gibbon was right, and Rome soon became "the love mistress of dead nations." Does England think that the shedding of Indian blood is to be the cement of foreign affection and colonial adhesion? If so, the India House may be pulled down to-morrow, and the day after the House of Commons may be destroyed.

On the 30th ult., the convoy from Corrientes was laying at anchor 10 miles above the Quebracho. It consisted of the British steamers *Gorgon, Firebrand, Alecto, Lizard*, and *Harpy*, the French steamers *Fulton* and *Gassendi*, corvette *Coquette*, brigs *San Martin, Procida* and *Fanny*, and brigantine *Dolphin*, besides from 65 to 70 merchantmen. As there has been no lack of north winds since the abovementioned date, it is probable that ere this there has been some hot work. The combined fleet has 84 guns of large calibre; the Argentines, on a line of 2 leagues in extent along banks from 60 to 70 feet high, 17 pieces of flying artillery and 700 muskets. We have but little doubt that the *Quebracho* will share with the *Vuelta de Obligado* the glory of imperishable celebrity in the annals of these countries.

General Mancilla has publicly proclaimed, in the daily papers, Captain Hotham to be "no true gentleman and an indifferent respecter of truth," on account of the report officially rendered by the latter of the action of Obligado; and the gallant General engages, at any time and in any place, to sustain with the sword what he affirms with the pen. We regret that we have not space this week to insert the General's communication at length; but we shall not fail to give it a place in our next. In the mean time we would remark that the General has only seen the French version of Capt. Hotham's report, and that there is a difference between it and the original English. In the latter, we are credibly informed—for we have no means of ascertaining the fact ourselves, all the papers containing the report having been abstracted from the Commercial Rooms—it is not stated, as in the French, that the Argentines had "10 vessels of war" but "10 fireships." Both assertions are equally false, but we think it proper to notice at once this circumstance in order to prevent quibbling.

MONTEVIDEO.—The British Legation in this capital did us the honor, a few days since, of forwarding to us the following notice:—

"H. M's. Government having received complaints from the East India Company in regard to the defects of the hides sent from South America, for the manufacture of soldier's accoutrements, owing to the brand which the proprietors of South America generally put upon their cattle; have given the necessary directions to communicate this information to the Estancieros of the Republic of the Uruguay, in the hope that they will perceive what an evident interest they have in marking their cattle in some less injurious manner, in order that their hides may obtain the highest price in foreign markets."—(*Comercio del Plata.*)

An Appeal on behalf of the British Subjects residing in and connected with the River Plate, against any further violent Intervention by the British and French Governments in the affairs of that country.

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The public have long been accustomed to hear of the unsettled state of affairs in the River Plate; yet but very few persons have felt sufficient interest in the matter to induce them to make themselves thoroughly acquainted with it. Nor was this at all to be wondered at, so long as this country abstained from interfering in the quarrel there; but now that Government have shewn a disposition to take a part, the case is changed, and it becomes the duty of those who from their position have a voice in the conduct of public affairs to inform themselves correctly on the subject. Nor should this duty be omitted on the plea that Government have better means of information than private individuals can have, and would not act without good grounds; for it is believed a very slight examination will shew that Government are acting in this matter under a misapprehension with reference both to the justice of the case and the true interests of all concerned.

Aware of the importance of brevity, we shall with these remarks proceed at once to our narrative, taking it up at the year 1838, from which period dates the origin of all the recent disasters in the River Plate. At that time General Rosas was at the head of the Government of Buenos Ayres, which is the chief province of the Argentine Confederation, on its south bank; and General Oribe at the head of that of the republic of the Uruguay, of which Montevideo is the capital, on the north bank.

In the beginning of the year, the French commenced their blockade of Buenos Ayres, and having no port of their own in which to condemn or sell their prizes, they wished to make use of Montevideo for that and other hostile purposes against Buenos Ayres, but General Oribe refused to join in this attack upon the sister republic, and determined on remaining neutral. The French agents thereupon stirred up an armed revolution against him—he was defeated—signed a forced abdication—and retired to Buenos Ayres.

In his stead was placed in the presidency General Rivera, who, indebted for his elevation to the French, repaid them by lending himself entirely to their plans. The defeat of General Oribe had been owing mainly to the help of a body of disaffected Buenos Ayreans who had taken refuge in Montevideo, and had joined Rivera and the French. By this triple union hostilities were carried on against Buenos Ayres with the greatest vigour—an army was marched into her territory—and reached almost within sight of the capital. Thus powerfully assailed, every one supposed she must fall, when apparently, as by a miracle, she rallied, the invaders were repulsed, and ultimately defeated and destroyed. The French, too, suddenly patched up a peace with her, and discontinued their blockade, which had lasted nearly three years.

It is important to remark here that the British Government did not interfere at all in behalf of Buenos Ayres while she was in these straits, but left her altogether to her own resources.

The hostility of the Montevideans against Buenos Ayres was not at all mitigated by the loss of their French allies. On the contrary, after a formal declaration of war, they again invaded the Argentine territory, where they were finally defeated in December, 1842.

On this occasion the Buenos Ayrean forces were commanded by the Ex-president Oribe. On his ejection from Montevideo for his refusal to take part against Buenos Ayres, General Rosas had in return promised to aid him, at the first fitting opportunity, to regain his position at Montevideo. In the mean time he had been employing himself in the service of Buenos Ayres.

After this victory, he in his turn marched into the territory of the Montevidean state, the whole of which, in the course of time, submitted to his authority, excepting only the city of Montevideo. Not having the means of taking it by storm, he invested it closely by land, and proposed to do the same by sea, by the aid of the Buenos Ayres squadron, which was placed at his disposal. But the English and French agents, though never going so far as openly to deny the legality of the blockade, prevented under various pretexts its ever being put in force.

This was the state of things in June last—Oribe posted close outside the city of Montevideo—the Buenos Ayres squadron in front, waiting permission from the English and French agents to invest it on the sea-side,—the inside party already thinking o making terms—when England and France interposed in favour of Montevideo, and commenced a series of measures which threaten a fresh war.

It will be seen from the above that the intervention of the two powers does not appear to be based upon any principles of justice. This is in favour rather of Oribe and Buenos Ayres, because the former is only seeking to regain his lost presidentship, and the latter merely repaying the friendship of Oribe, endeavouring to guard against a recurrence of Montevideo.

Nor can we account for the intervention by any advantages it may be expected to bring to this country, for the only tie hitherto between us and the River Plate has been that of commerce, the ruin of which will be the infallible result of the intervention if persisted in.

Still, as Government, it may be supposed, would not have acted without good reasons, we propose to show, that, (though no doubt with the best intentions,) they have acted wrong from incorrect information.

One of the main inducements for their interference seems to have been an idea that Buenos Ayres is desirous of destroying the existence of Montevideo as an independent state. Now, the only colour for this apprehension is the circumstance of Oribe employing Buenos Ayrean troops in his service. But if certain Buenos Ayreans helped to turn him out, why should not others of the same nation help to reinstate him? That Buenos Ayres should wish to have a friendly neighbour in Montevideo instead of an unfriendly one is quite natural. The same feeling induced us to assist in ejecting Napoleon from the throne of France, and placing the Bourbons in his stead, only we had none of the French on our side, whereas Oribe has more of his countrymen for him than against him. Yet no one would say that the independence of France has been destroyed by our interference on that occasion. Moreover, both Buenos Ayres and Oribe have constantly denied any such intention, and he is a native of the Uruguay State, and for three years filled the office of President of it without any imputation upon his patriotism; indeed his jealousy of the independence of his country, which made him refuse to become a tool in the hands of the French, was the cause of his ejection. Surely, therefore, this fear must be allowed to be without any rational foundation.

Even were it otherwise, it does not seem clear for what reason we should interfere in the matter. It can hardly be said to be the duty of this country to adjust the relations of the different states to each other all over the world. We do not appear always so to have considered it, for we allowed Santa Cruz, when President of Bolivia, to subjugate a great portion of the west coast of South America without troubling ourselves at all about it. True, it has been said we are bound by treaty to uphold the independence of the Uruguay republic, but those who have so stated could cite nothing in proof of their assertion but a preliminary convention made in 1828 between Buenos Ayres and Brazil, to which neither England nor Montevideo were even parties, and which is besides quite irrelevant to the question. Brazil and Buenos Ayres, who had been fighting for the possession of the Uruguay territory, agreed by this convention that it should belong to neither, but should form a state by itself, and that they would uphold its legal government against all attacks upon it for five years, and after that time for such further period as should be agreed upon in a definitive treaty of peace to be afterwards made. As this, however, has not yet been made, and as the first five years have long expired, the convention may be said to be now virtually a dead letter; but if not, and if it be held still to be in force, it favours rather than condemns the interference of Buenos Ayres, because one of its main stipulations being that the two contracting powers should render all necessary assistance to the legal government of Montevideo; and Oribe being considered by Buenos Ayres the legal President, the aid furnished to him by her is obviously quite in accordance with the spirit of the treaty.

A notion, which it is believed has made some impression on Her Majesty's Government, is that General Rosas has a project in his mind for excluding foreigners from the River Plate, and that it is necessary to uphold an antagonist government in Montevideo in order to counteract it. Now the course followed thus far by the Buenos Ayres Government with reference to foreign trade, does not give any countenance to this fear. It is a mere assumption destitute of any proof, and to act upon it as if it were an ascertained fact, would be neither just nor reasonable.

We should be quite in good time to counteract any such intention when it took the form of action, for not all the armies of South America could hold out Montevideo for one day against an adequate British naval force. There can be therefore no wisdom in now taking measures which will involve a great loss and expense, for the sake of guarding against an evil which may never arise, and which may easily and immediately be removed if it should.

The charge against the Buenos Ayres Government of hostility to foreign commerce has originated mainly from certain interruptions to the local and coasting trade, which have occurred in the course of this war. One of the most notable was their interdiction in January last of all trade with Corrientes and Paraguay, so long as the former province should remain in the hands of the persons who had revolted against the lawful authorities. This decree was not merely no proof of hostility to trade, but it was, under the circumstances, in every sense of the word, a justifiable one. Corrientes had seized and confiscated a number of vessels belonging to Buenos Ayres, with their cargoes, which were going up the river through its territory to Paraguay. The Government of Buenos Ayres might have retaliated by seizing the vessels of Corrientes, but they contented themselves with simply forbidding all intercourse with that province so long as the hostile party should remain in power, that they might not by a repetition of similar acts be enabled to furnish themselves with resources at the expense of the citizens of Buenos Ayres. It certainly is not reasonable to complain of such a decree issued under such provocation.

All the other interruptions to trade have been in like manner temporary—limited in extent and circumstances—adapted for some special purpose—and such as a state of war renders both justifiable and customary; and they no more prove a hostile feeling to commerce on the part of Buenos Ayres, than does our present blockade of Buenos Ayres prove a hostile feeling to commerce generally on the part of England.

It wonld be easy to show that Buenos Ayres has always evinced a more even and considerate regard to the interests of trade than Montevideo. The import duties in the former place have not varied for the last fifteen years, being nominally 19 per cent. on cottons, woollens, and linens, and 12 per cent. on silks, but in reality, (owing to the moderate system of valuing goods,) not over 16 to 17 per cent., and 10 to 11 per cent. on the selling prices. In Montevideo, on the contrary, the rates of duty, which in 1839 were 19 per cent. and 10 per cent., were suddenly raised to 27 and 18 per cent., and on the British Consul remonstrating against it, they were raised again to 35 and 26 per cent., being more than double the Buenos Ayres rates. Since the war, they have reduced them, but there being scarcely any business doing, the reduction has been of little advantage.

Another striking proof has just been given of the superior liberality of the Buenos Ayres Government over that of Montevideo, in regard to their mode of treating the commercial interests. The former, in order to relieve the heavy pressure npon the merchants arising from the blockade, have relaxed their custom-house laws, and granted new and important facilities for the payment of the duties; whilst the latter, greedy to turn to account a convoy offered by Her Majesty's naval forces up the rivers, refused to allow goods to leave the harbour with it, except on payment of a new duty of 6 per cent. Most of these goods were originally destined for Buenos Ayres, but being forbidden entry there by the British blockading squadron, had no other resource but to take refuge in the harbour of Montevideo. Thus our blockade drives goods in there, for them to levy tribute upon. As a tax of 20 per cent. would be as justifiable as one of 6 per cent., it will be surprising if it be not increased. On goods lying in their bonded warehouses—placed there (as the term "bonded" implies) on the clear understanding that they were to be reshipped without payment of *any* duty—a tax of 4 per cent. was levied. These two contemporary incidents show how untruly Buenos Ayres has been stated to be less favourable to commerce than her neighbour.

Pains have been taken to represent the trade of Montevideo as of more consequence than that of Buenos Ayres. It would be easy to bring figures to show that this is not true, but it is not worth while to weary our readers with them. It is sufficient to say, that if the trade is left to its natural course, each port will get such portion of it as the convenience of its situation and other local circumstances attract to it. Nor is it of any importance to this country which has the most, nor have we any interest in depressing one or favouring the other. To our merchants and manufacturers it is immaterial to which they send most of their goods. At whichever their customers prefer purchasing,

they can deliver them. It would be easy to pick out years when, owing to the blockade of Buenos Ayres, Montevideo was doing the largest business, and, vice versa, others in which, owing to the war in Montevideo, Buenos Ayres was. But to argue from such figures, that the one was of more importance than the other, would be as silly as if, shutting up all the doors of the Royal Exchange but one, you were to say, *that* one must be the most important door, because everybody then went in and out by it. From the statistics of the trade, however, one very important fact would appear, which is, that when either Buenos Ayres or Montevideo is shut, the amount of business done in the port that remains open is very far short of the total amount that is done in both ports when both are open. So that our interest is to keep both open, and to let the people of the country suit themselves as to which they find it most convenient to resort to.

A great deal has been said of the importance of the markets of Corrientes and Paraguay, and of the hardship of their being closed to our commerce. We have already shown that the closing of these markets is only temporary, produced by the war, and sure to end with it. It was under the present Government of Buenos Ayres, that the communication with Paraguay was opened, after having been closed by its own Government for thirty years, and it would have remained open till this day, but for the unjustifiable act of Corrientes above mentioned. Violence, therefore, is not only needless for opening the interior rivers, but will probably even defeat our object, for they never can be permanently and really kept open, without the good-will and consent of the people of the countries they flow through. As respects the supposed importance of these markets, the value of the trade with Corrientes may be estimated by the amount of its population, which Sir W. Parish estimated at 35,000 to 40,000 in 1836-7. Paraguay, on the principle of *omne ignotum pro magnifico*, has been represented in a light altogether imaginative. The expectations formed of it were much disappointed on its opening in 1842. The people were found to be in almost the lowest stage of mental existence. Their staple product, the Yerba, is worthless in Europe, and the consumption of it is limited to a very small portion of South America, so that it would be useless for them to increase the growth of it, as they would find no market for the additional quantity. The same may be said of their tobacco, which is equally unsuitable for the European markets. In short they have no exports worth speaking of that would find sale in Europe, and the idea of any large trade with them is the merest chimera. Sir W. Parish estimates their population at 250,000, but even if it were ten times the number, their backwardness in the arts of useful industry would make them of little importance to us as customers. The population of the Argentine provinces is estimated by the same authority at 600,000 to 675,000, and of the single province of Buenos Ayres alone at 180,000 to 200,000. It may be safely affirmed that one week of its consumption of British manufactures is worth a whole year's of that of Paraguay. There would be no inducement therefore to sacrifice the one trade for the other, even if we could not have them both; but still less is there, as with a little patience the trade of Paraguay, such as it is, will be sure to revert to us, without the expenditure of a single shilling.

The plea of humanity—a very popular one, and one very likely to be abused—has been put forward to justify this interference. Six years ago, when the Montevideans invaded Buenos Ayres, or even three years ago, when the tables turned and the Buenos Ayreans invaded Montevideo, there might have been some humanity in interfering in an effectual manner, to put a stop (if possible) to this war. But after allowing it to rage unchecked in all its fierceness for six years, and after waiting till it has literally burned itself out, and is on the point of expiring, so to speak, for want of fuel, there is certainly no humanity in rekindling it Can we restore to life the thousands that have perished, or blot out the atrocities that have been committed, or replace the property that has been destroyed, or undo the ruin that has been caused? Or shall we not rather renew and perpetuate these evils, and in endeavouring to wrest from Oribe what it has taken him so many years to gain, cause even still greater ones?

Besides, the difficulty of the task is much greater now, than if we had interfered earlier; then, there was a strong party which by means of our assistance might have made head against Oribe. But it is now extinct—its last defeat at India Muerta in March, 1845, gave it the coup-de-grace. There is not now a man in arms against him in the whole country, excepting in the city of Montevideo. Even there, they are destitute of provisions—ammunition—money—every thing requisite. All, therefore, would now have to be done by our own unassisted efforts.

That the intervention has not met with the success which appears, without much consideration, to have peen anticipated for it, is to be attributed rather to the unreasonableness of our demands, than to obstinacy on the part of Oribe and his ally. For the last seven years, let it be borne in mind, this chief has devoted his life and energies to one sole object—the re-establishment of his authority in his native country, over which he was undeniably the lawful ruler, when ejected by the French. At the moment when he sees it on the point of being realized, we, professing the strictest impartiality, require him, not to make some slight sacrifice in favor of his adversaries, but to throw away the whole of his advantages, and to submit to terms at our hands, which, had he been defeated and utterly prostrate, instead of triumphantly victorious, he might even then almost have objected to as being too unfavourable. Our demand is nothing less than he should immediately evacuate the territory of his country, leaving it in full possession of his adversaries, to whom, after having lost the game they had played for, we thus purpose he should return the whole of the stakes.

There may be some, perhaps, whom it will not surprise to hear, that as the French were from the first at the bottom of all these disasters, so they have throughout, consistently, had a principal share in prolonging them. In a dispatch from M. Guizot to Count St. Aulaire, dated 21st January, 1845,* which has been just published, the former distinctly states, that but for the rebellious conduct of a number of the French subjects in Montevideo, who, in defiance of the repeated orders of their Government to lay down their arms, and abstain from any farther part in this war, obstinately refused to do so, the war would long ago have terminated. The conclusion that any fair person would have come to on witnessing this contumacy, would, one should think, have been to enforce the orders of the Government, and compel these parties to observe the neutrality which was held to be their duty. But quite the contrary to this, M. Guizot concludes that as they will not obey their Government, their Government must obey them; and he decides, accordingly, to take part with them against Oribe, as he has done.

One of the schemes by which these Frenchmen in Montevideo evaded the orders of their own Government is worthy of being mentioned. On being required by Admiral Lainé to lay down their arms, they did so *as French subjects, and immediately took them up again as citizens of the Oriental Republic*, and have held them as such ever since When we see such a farcical proceeding as this not only winked at by the French Government, but actually rewarded with their assistance, it is difficult to believe they were ever sincerely desirous that their orders should be obeyed.

(*To be continued.*)

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*Appendix.

Extract of a Dispatch from M. Guizot to the French Ambassador at the Court of St. James's, dated Paris, January 21st, 1845.

You are aware of the ferocious warfare which desolates the left bank of La Plata. In consequence of its disputes with the Government of the republic of Buenos Ayres, the King's Government had allowed itself to be drawn into an interference in the local struggles which more particularly divide the republic of Montevideo. By the treaty of the 29th of October, 1840, France made peace with General Rosas; at the same time she renounced all participation in the internal quarrels of the country, on condition that the independence of the republic of Montevideo should be respected. Since that period war has continued. A former President of the republic of Buenos Ayres has laid siege to the city of Montevideo, which has defended itself with obstinacy. The King's Government has often heen pressed during the last four years to interfere once more in this contest; it has always refused to do so. Two principal reasons have determined it to abstain—first, the right to meddle, without absolute necessity, in the affairs of the two independent states had not been acknowledged; secondly, there has always been, moreover, sufficient reason for believing that the question would soon terminate of itself by the close of the war.

A part of the French emigrants established at Montevideo has thought proper to rise in insurrection against this policy of their Government. In spite of the reiterated warnings of their Consul, these French have taken arms for the defence of the existing Government of that republic against General Oribe, and have left nothing undone to compromise the national flag in this cause, thus arrogating to themselves the right of peace and war, which belongs to the King alone. We have combatted this claim, as it was our duty to do. The King's Consul at Montevideo has energetically defended the principle of the neutrality of foreigners.

The French legion, however, have not laid down their arms, and this unexpected resolution of a part of the foreign residents has prolonged the resistance of the city. At present the resistance no longer appears on the point of terminating. The state of war is maintained, and with it all the sufferings which may result therefrom to the interests of those foreigners who have remained neuter. Commerce is interrupted by land and sea; the city of Montevideo has been in a state of blockade for nearly two years; and the country is ravaged by the excursions of the two armies. This state of things calls for a prompt termination, if we do not wish to allow the consummation of the ruin of those French who have remained faithful to their duty, and who urgently entreat our protection in the unfortunate and perilous situation ***in which the obstinate blindness of a part of their fellow-countrymen has so much contributed to plunge them.***

Correspondence between General San Martin and General Rosas.

To H. E. the Captain General, President of the Argentine Republic, D. Juan Manuel de Rosas.

Naples, 11th January, 1845.

Sir and esteemed General,

In the early part of November last, I undertook a journey to Italy, for the purpose of trying if its benign climate would recruit my impaired health; the relief which I have till now experienced has been but very slight, which is to me a source of great chagrin as in the circumstances in which our country is now placed, it would have been higly flattering to me to have been able to offer it my services once more, (as I did to you in the first French blockade) services, which, although I am aware they would be of little utility, would, notwithstanding, shew that in the unjust aggression and abuse of force by England and France against our country, it had still one old defender of its honour and independence. But since the state of my health deprives me of this satisfaction, I feel gratified at least in making these sentiments manifest to you, as also my unshaken confidence in the triumph of justice which is on our side.

Accept, my esteemed General, the heartfelt wishes I offer up that you may terminate the present contest with success and honour. With these sentiments I repeat myself your affectionate servant and fellow-countryman.

JOSE DE SAN MARTIN.

Signior General José de San Martin.

La Encarnacion at Palermo de San Benito, May 20, 1846.

My dear and respected General,

The pleasure which I have felt on reading your esteemed letter dated at Naples, the 11th of last January, has been so much the greater as it conveys to our country a remembrance and a wish worthy of the heroic defender of its independence and honour.

General, there is not one true Argentine—not a single American—who, on hearing your illustrious name, and knowing what you are still doing for your country and for the American cause, does not feel his ardour and his confidence redoubled. The moral influence of your patriotic American wishes, in the present circumstances, as in the former French blockade, is a distinguished service to the independence of our country and of the American continent, to which you consecrated with so much glory and honour the best days of your life.

I am deeply concerned on account of the continued impaired state of your important health. I hope for your re-establishment and preservation, and that the mild climate of Italy will be more favourable to you than it has hitherto been.

Indisposed as you are, after so many fatigues, you recall and express the predominating idea of all your life; the independence of America is irrevocable, said you, after having liberated your native country, Chili and Peru. This is worthy of you.

I accept with gratitude and high esteem your benevolent wishes for the happy termination of the present struggle, and wish you the best health and happiness.

I am, respectfully, your devoted fellow-countryman and friend.

JUAN M. DE ROSAS.

MARINE LIST.

PORT of BUENOS AYRES.

May 30.—Wind W.S.W.

Sailed, Brazilian brigantine of war Olinda, 10 guns, Capt. Amazonas, for Montevideo.

Passengers.—Messrs. Beckman, Heraud, and 3 others.

During the night, Sardinian schooner of war Ninfa del Plata, Capt. Serra Cassano, for Montevideo.

Passengers.—Messrs. Nouguier, Luco, and 19 others.

May 31.—Wind W.

No arrivals or sailings.

June 1.—Wind W.

No arrivals or sailings.

June 2.—Wind W.

No arrivals or sailings.

June 3.—Wind W.

No arrivals or sailings.

June 4.—Wind N., in the afternoon changed to N.W.

No arrivals or sailings.

June 5.—Wind N.N.E.

No arrivals or sailings.

MERCHANT VESSELS

IN THE PORT OF BUENOS AYRES ON FRIDAY LAST.

NONE.

FOREIGN VESSELS OF WAR.

BRITISH.—Ship Melampus, 42 guns, Captain John Norman Campbell.

Brig Racer, 16 guns, Captain Archibald Reed.

FRENCH—Brig Adonis, 20 guns, Capt. Colet.

SARDINIAN—Brig Daino, 14 guns, Captain Chevalier Scaffiero.

THERMOMETER in the Mirador of the Commercial Room since our last:—

Saturday........................53
Sunday..........................43
Monday..........................40
Tuesday.........................40
Wednesday.......................40
Thursday........................44
Friday..........................45

Advertisements.

The following cheap Works may be had at cost price at the Buenos Ayres Commercial Rooms:—

Rody the Rover; or, the Ribbonman, by Wm. Carleton.
Droll Dramas for Christmas Comedians and Parlour Performers, by R. M. Evans.
Chambers's Miscellany.
The Cricket on the Heath, by Charles Dickens.
The Juvenile Museum.
The Knitting Book, (second series) by Miss Lambert
The Countess Faustina, by Ida, Countess Hahn Hahn, (translated from the German.)
The Amber Witch.

June 6, 1846.

To Let,

A BED-ROOM and Sitting Room, furnished or unfurnished, with board if required. Enquire at No. 3 Calle 25 de Mayo.

Sale by Auction,

BY IBARRA & MACOME,

AT the Store No. 35, University Street, on Monday 8th June, and the following days, at 11 o'clock precisely, will be Sold by Auction to the highest bidder, all the Stock in Trade of Hosiery and Mercery of the late Don Luis de las Carreras, by order of the assignees of said estate. Particulars will be seen in the daily papers.

Notice.

THE undersigned being about to leave the country for a short time, begs to inform the public that his business during his absence will be managed by Mr. SAMUEL RENSHAW PHIBBS. All persons having any claims against the undersigned are requested to send their accounts to be liquidated immediately.

Saladero del Alto, Buenos Ayres, May 26, 1846.

WILLIAM DOWNES.

ADVERTISEMENT.

ALL Persons indebted to A. Cameron are requested to call at the Store No. 46 Calle de la Reconquista, and settle their accounts without delay. A. C. likewise begs to intimate to those to whom he may be indebted that by presenting their accounts at the abovementioned Store they will obtain immediate attention.

Egg, Krutisch & Co.

HAVE Removed their Establishment from Calle Perú, No. 86, to Calle Universidad, No. 172.

Notice.

ALL correspondence left in the letter box at the Commercial Rooms for the United States, will be forwarded by every opportunity *via* Montevideo or Rio Janeiro, through Joseph Graham, Esq., United States Consul.

Henry Godfrey,

DISPENSING & FAMILY CHEMIST,

No. 30, Calle de la Catedral,

BEGS to inform his friends and the public that he has reopened the above Establishment with a complete assortment of Chemicals, Drugs, Perfumery, and articles of domestic use.

At the same time takes this opportunity of stating that all Prescriptions entrusted to him will be dispensed under his immediate inspection, and trusts by a strict regard to the purity of every article, combined with an unremitting personal attention to all orders, to insure s continuance of that confidence which it has ever been his anxious wish to merit.

THE following select and useful articles having already met with extensive patronage, are respectfully offered to the public:—

Almond flavour
Do. paste
Arrow root
Camphor dentifrice
Cold cream
Corn plaister
Eau de Berlin
Do. Cologne
Essences for the handkerchief
Ginger beer and lemonade powders
Lemonade and orchata
Lavender water
Lozenges, various
Marking ink
Mustard, pickles
Spices, essence of anchovies
Raspberry vinegar
Magnesia, Henry's
Do. Murray's
Rowland's perfumery
Alsana extract
Kalydor
Lavender water
Macassar oil
Odonto
Tooth, hair, and nail brushes
Tooth paste and powders
Syrian dye
Rose and violet powder, with puff boxes
Windsor and fancy soaps
Vinegar, aromatic, and smelling salts
Seidlitz and soda
Powders in boxes and cases.

Great saving in Coal.

NOTICE TO HOUSE KEEPERS.

JOSEPH MEARES,

No. 52, Calle la Paz,

BEGS to inform the public that he has just received a few American Economical Cooking Stoves; also a variety of Grates and hot air Stoves, Fire Irons, Coal Boxes, and a large assortment of domestic utensils.

PILOT CLOTH, considerably under the market price, for Sale at No. 55 Calle Piedad, also, Merino shirts and drawers.

Omnibus and Volantas,

FOR the THORNDIKE RERTAURANT, will leave the corner of Corrientes aud Alameda Streets, at morning and evening on feast days. Families wising to visit the Quinta, can have either of the vehicles to call at their residence, on any day required, by leaving written orders the day previous at the Quinta, or at 113, Piedad Stteet.

Pegged Boots, Shoes, and Brogans.

THE Subscribers respectfully advise the public that they have established, on the most approved method, a manufacture of the abovementioned articles; they have secured experienced workmen, and use only the best materials. The public is requested to call and examine the stock of Boots Shoes and Brogans, which are fresh, and will be sold to suit purchasers, at prices lower than they have ever been introduced for from abroad. A liberal discount will be made to persons purchasing lots to sell retail.

THOMAS WIRE & CO.,
113, Piedad Street

Genuine Havana Cigars.

BY the last arrivals, (before the blockade) the subscriber received a consignment of a few thousands of real Havanas, of the celebrated "Norma Brand," in quarter boxes of 250, which he will sell by the single box if needed, as he wishes to close them.

W. L. TENKER,
55, Calle de la Catedral.

m. 2—3 t.

DENTISTRY,

Cathedral Street, No. 55.

Mr. Tenker,

Doctor in Surgeon Dentistry,

CONTINUES as usual the practice of his profession in all its branches: fills teeth with gold, silver, tin, lead, or mineral cement. He has discovered a preparation to destroy the nerves of diseased teeth, so that they can be filled without pain and rendered useful; inserts the latest improved mineral teeth so exactly to suit the form of the mouth and expression of the countenance as to deceive the eye of the most critical observer. A residence of six years in South America has giving him many advantages to study the diseases of the teeth and gums peculiar to the climate. His preparations are now extensively used, and can *only* be had at his office.

Pampa Water, to cleanse and purify the mouth, &c. &c. &c.

Andean Balsom, to loosen the tartar, which causes the gums to recede from the roots of the teeth, &c., &c., &c.

Fire King's remedy for the tooth ache, so generally known which always alleviates, and often cures, this painful malady

Tooth Powder to clean, preserve the teeth, and harden the gums, &c., &c., &c. m. 2—3 t.

REQUIRED to go to the country, a Female Servant of all work, for a small family. Unexceptionable character is indispensable. Apply at No. 13 Calle Maypú.

PRICES CURRENT.

	$		$	
Doubloons, Spanish	405	á	407	each
Do. Patriot	404	á	406	do.
Plata, macuquina	19	á	20	do. for one
Dollars, Spanish	24½	á	24¾	each.
Do. Patriot & Patacones	24	á	24½	do.
Six per cent. Stock	80	á	82	do. per cent.
Exchange on England	2⅛d.	á		
Do. France	23	á	24	cent. per dollar
Do. Rio Janeiro	3			per ct. premium
Do. Montevideo	5	á	6	do.
Do. United States	19	á	22	
Hides, Ox, for Engld & Germy	49	á	50	per pesada.
Do. France	42	á	46	do.
Do. North America	40	á	42	do.
Do. Spain	45	á	50	do.
Do. salted	41	á	42	do.
Do. Horse	22	á	25	do. each
Calf skins	40	á	50	per pesada
Sheep skins, common	22	á	24	per dozen
Do. fine	32	á	34	do.
Deer skins	without price			do.
Goat skins	do.			do.
Nutria skins	2¼	á	2½	dol. per lb
Chinchilli skins	no price.			dol. per dozen.
Horse hair, short	35	á	40	dol. per arroba
Do. mixed	46	á	52	do.
Do. long	100	á	120	do.
Wool, common, washed	18	á	22	do.
Do. picked	without price			do.
Do. shorn from skins	do			do.
Do. mestiza, dirty	12	á	30	do
Tallow, pure	23	á	25	do.
Do. raw	15	á	17	do.
Do. with grease	18	á	19	do.
Jerked beef	without price			per quintal.
Horns, mixed	75	á	100	per thousand
Do. Ox	300	á	400	do.
Shin bones	without price			do.
Hide cuttings	8	á	10	per 100 lbs.
Ostrich feathers, white	without price			per lb.
Do. black	9	á	10	do.
Salted tongues	7	á	8	per dozen
Salt, on board	none.			per fanega.
Discount	1½	á	2½	per cent. month

The highest price of Doubloons during the week 410 dollars. The lowest price 395 dollars.

The highest rate of Exchange upon England during the week 2 1-8. The lowest do. 2 1-16d.

GEORGE THOMAS, Responsible Editor.